Strategic interactions, incomplete information and learning by Berardi, Michele
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Strategic interactions, incomplete
information and learning
Michele Berardi
6. May 2012
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38651/
MPRA Paper No. 38651, posted 7. May 2012 22:19 UTC
Strategic interactions, incomplete information
and learning
Michele Berardi
The University of Manchester
May 6, 2012
Abstract
In a model of incomplete, heterogeneous information, with externalities and strategic in-
teractions, we analyze the possibility for learning to act as coordination device. We build on
the framework proposed by Angeletos and Pavan (2007) and extend it to a dynamic multi-
period setting where agents need to learn to coordinate. We analyze conditions under which
adaptive and eductive learning obtain, and show that adaptive learning conditions are less
demanding than the eductive ones: in particular, when actions are strategic substitutes, the
equilibrium is always adaptively learnable, while it might not be eductively so. In case of
heterogeneous preferences, moreover, convergence only depends on the average characteristic
of agents in the economy. We also show that adaptive learning dynamics converge to the game
theoretical strategic equilibrium, which means that agents can learn to act strategically in a
simple and straightforward way.
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1 Introduction
In recent years a growing literature has analyzed macroeconomic models under learning dynamics
(for an authoritative treatise, see Evans and Honkapohja, 2001) by following the common practice
of replacing the expectational operators, which arise at the semi-reduced form of the model after
aggregation and linearization of microfounded equations describing agentsoptimal behavior, with
an explicit expectations formation mechanism that is meant to represent the evolution of agents
beliefs under adaptive learning.
While this practice is valid to a rst approximation and has indeed delivered useful insights into
the properties of economic models under learning, it neglects the fact that behind a macro model
there is often hidden, at the micro level, a component of coordination. This tension between micro
coordination and macro outcomes is easily resolved under the assumption of rational expectations,
which deliver a xed point in the coordination problem. But once agents are deprived of full
rationality, as it happens in the learning literature, the issue of coordination becomes critical and
its solution is connected at a deep level with the learning activity of agents and the dynamics of
their beliefs, which ultimately a¤ect aggregate outcomes.
A typical example is Muths price model, where rms need to coordinate their production
decisions based on information conveyed by prices. Carton and Guse (2010) consider a game the-
oretic version of this model, and show how adaptive learning and replicator dynamics learning can
give rise to rather di¤erent outcomes when rms have a discrete set of possible production levels.
The learning mechanism used by agents therefore a¤ects the solution to the coordination problem
implicit in their production decisions. More in general, there are a number of macroeconomic
models that lay hidden underneath a coordination problem among agents and that rely on the
assumption that such a problem has been somehow solved.
The aim of the present work is to consider such coordination problems explicitly and investigate
conditions under which agents can learn to coordinate. To this end, we use a setting proposed by
Angeletos and Pavan (2007), which neatly captures the need for agents to forecast other agents
actions in order to maximize their own utility.
In a model where individual utility depends not only on a fundamental of the economy but
also on the aggregate action in the population, agents need to anticipate other peoples behavior
in order to decide their own action. In such setting, we investigate whether agents can learn to
coordinate on the best strategy using either adaptive or eductive learning. With the rst, agents
rely on the information observable at the aggregate level and use statistical techniques in order to
process such information and form expectations about future aggregate actions; with the second,
instead, agents engage in a mental process of reasoning to try to determine their best response to
other agentsactions: coordination on an equilibrium is achieved if repeated deletion of dominated
strategies leads to a unique action for all agents.
Of course, the possibility for agents to learn and coordinate on an equilibrium depends on the
amount and quality of information available to them. In our analysis, we will rst assume that
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the fundamental process determining the state of the economy is observable to agents and we
will focus solely on the problem of coordination: besides knowledge of the fundamental, in fact,
agents will need to have some expectation about the average action in the economy in order to
decide their best strategy. The way they form such expectations about other agentsactions will
determine their own actions and therefore the possibility of convergence to an equilibrium.
We will then build on the global games literature and assume that the fundamental itself
is not observable to agents but that they have access to noisy private and public signals about
such fundamental. Given this information, agents need to chose their optimal action, taking into
account the fact that everybody else in the economy is also doing the same.
In both settings, we will consider in turn adaptive and eductive learning. Under adaptive learn-
ing, agents rely on observables and econometric techniques in order to infer missing information
and inform their decisions about actions, while under eductive learning agents rely on a mental
process of reasoning that, by iteratively deleting dominated strategies, tries to single out a Nash
equilibrium for the economy.
The framework we propose will allow us to investigate the interaction between the problem
of learning, as usually addressed in the macro literature, and that of coordination. We will
show how adaptive and eductive learning can in fact act as coordination devices in a model with
heterogeneous information and strategic interactions. The key parameter that governs learnability
will turn out the be the private value of coordination: only if agents dont overreact to the expected
actions of others, they will be able to coordinate on an equilibrium. Interestingly, adaptive learning
can guide agents towards the game theoretical strategic equilibrium of the model, without them
having to engage in higher order thinking but solely relying on information observable in the
economy. This key result shows how powerful this mechanism is in guiding agentsactions towards
equilibrium.
Lastly, we will consider the issue of coordination based on a sunspot variable, one that, though
unrelated to fundamentals, could a¤ect the economy simply because agents deem it relevant and
use it in their forecasts. We will show, though, that in the present framework agents can not learn
to coordinate based on a sunspot component.
1.1 Related literature
Our contribution is related and builds on a number of works, and it merges concepts from di¤erent
strains of literature. The most directly related work, in terms of the basic framework used, is
Angeletos and Pavan (2007), who introduce a general setting in which agentsbest actions depend
on the aggregate action in the economy, and agents must solve a coordination problem in order
to maximize their utility. They nd that the value agents attach to coordination is crucial in
determining the equilibrium and welfare properties of the economy.
The information structure for our economy is borrowed from the literature on global games,
i.e., coordination games of incomplete information. Morris and Shin (1998, 2001) famously showed
that some degree of uncertainty about the fundamentals can be benecial as it solves the problem
of multiple equilibria in the economy. Angeletos, Hellwig, Pavan (2007) then extended the static
framework of global games to allow agents to take (binary) actions repeatedly over many periods
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and to learn about the underlying fundamentals: they show that in this dynamic setting multi-
plicity of equilibria can emerge under the same conditions that would guarantee uniqueness in the
static benchmark. We will not touch upon this aspect though in the present work and only focus
on a setting where there is a unique fundamental symmetric equilibrium for the economy.
The spirit of the paper is close to several works in the game theoretical literature, though
it takes a more macro oriented approach. Marimon and McGrattan (1992), in a critical review
of adaptive learning in repeatedly played strategic form games, show that if agents use adaptive
learning rules with inertia and experimentation, the strategy played converges to a subset of
rationalizable strategies. Beggs (2009) considers adaptive learning in Bayesian games with binary
actions, a framework that includes many of the applications of the theory of global games, and
presents conditions under which convergence obtains. Crawford (1995) shows how results from
experiments in coordination games can be explained by assuming that agents learn to coordinate
using simple linear adjustment rules.
We also refer to concepts from the literature on rationalizable equilibria. Guesnerie (1992)
rst considered the problem of how a rational expectations equilibrium can emerge as the outcome
of the mental process of iterated deletion of dominated strategies by rational agents concerned
with maximizing their own utility while recognizing that all other agents in the economy are
doing the same. Evans and Guesnerie (1993) then examined the connection between expectational
stability (adaptive learning) and strong rationality (eductive learning) by embedding a linear
rational expectations model into a game-theoretic framework.
Also relevant to our work is the literature on coordination and higher order beliefs, though
we leave the explicit consideration of such a problem in the contest of adaptive learning to future
research. Important and related works in this area are Townsend (1983) and Marcet and Sargent
(1989): in the former, rms face the problem of forecasting the forecasts of others, and this gives
rise to an innite regress problem which is then solved by Marcet and Sargent (1989) by using
adaptive learning to compute the relevant equilibrium for the model.
Lastly, we build on the literature on sunspot equilibria. The possibility of an economy being
driven by sunspot variables, i.e., variables unrelated to fundamentals, has received a lot of attention
in the literature, at least since the works of Azariadis (1981), Cass and Shell (1983) and Guesnerie
(1986). In relation to learning, the possibility of sunspot equilibria to be stable under learning
dynamics has been considered in Woodford (1990), Evans and Honkapohja (1994), Evans and
Honkapohja (2003) and Evans and McGough (2005). The general message that can be taken from
this literature is that, though sunspot equilibria can be learnable, this usually requires rather strict
conditions, and the outcome depends on the representation used by agents.
1.2 Plan of the paper
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the basic model and shows the symmetric
equilibrium under full information and rationality; Section 3 introduces learning when there is
full information about the fundamental but uncertainty about other agents actions; Section 4
analyzes learning when there is incomplete and private information about the fundamental; Section
5 considers the possibility of agents using a sunspot variable to coordinate; Section 6 discusses the
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main results of the paper; and Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
The basic framework is borrowed from Angeletos and Pavan (2007), though we introduce time and
make it a multi-period dynamic setting. Moreover, we will allow for heterogeneity in preferences
among agents.
There is a continuum of agents on the unit interval, indexed by i, and each agent i needs
to choose his own action kit in order to maximize his utility, which depends on an exogenous
fundamental t and on the actions of other agents.
The utility of each agent i is given by
Ut = U(k
i
t;Kt; k;t; t) (1)
where
Kt =
Z 1
0
kitdi (2)
k;t =
Z 1
0
 
kit  Kt
2
di
 1
2
(3)
and U is quadratic with partial derivatives Uk = UK = U = 0 and U(k;K; 0; ) = 0 for all
(k;K; ). This means that the dispersion of actions in the population has only a second order, non
strategic e¤ect on individual utility. Technically, it means that utility is separable in .
The exogenous fundamental is dened by
t =  + "t; (4)
where "t is an i.i.d. shock, normally distributed with mean zero and variance 2".
Since each agent i chooses kit in order to maximize his own utility, given his expectations of
other agentsactions and of the fundamental, we have
kit = argmax
k
Eit

U(kit;Kt; k;t; t)

: (5)
Following the argument in Angeletos and Pavan (2007), it is possible to show that the solution
to this problem for the generic agent i must solve
kit = E
i
tKt + (1  )Eit (t) (6)
where
   UkK
Ukk
(7)
and  (t) is the full information solution given in Section 2.1 below. Parameter  represents the
private value of coordination: individual actions are strategic complements if  > 0, and strategic
substitutes if  < 0. In the course of this work we will consider also the case where agents have
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individual utility functions that di¤er from each other in the value they assign to coordination and
agents are therefore characterized by individual i.
In order to decide their best action, agents need to form expectations to be put into (6): the
aim of this work is to analyze the coordination problem for agents under di¤erent assumptions
about information sets and expectations formation processes for agents.
2.1 Equilibrium under full information and rationality
If agents are homogeneous, rational and they all observe t, the problem reduces to
kt = argmax
k
Et [U(kt; kt; 0; t)] (8)
and with a quadratic utility function, the solution kt = (t) is linear (see Angeletos and Pavan,
2007):
(t) = 0 + 1t; (9)
with
0 =  Uk (0; 0; 0; 0)
Ukk + UkK
(10)
1 =   Uk
Ukk + UkK
: (11)
In this case agents have no uncertainty and their optimal action depends on their own preferences
(through 0 and 1) and on an observable exogenous component (t). They can therefore im-
plement their optimal policy (9). Following Angeletos and Pavan (2007, Supplement), assuming
Ukk < 0 and  UkK=Ukk < 1 ensures uniqueness and boundedness of equilibrium under complete
information.1
In the course of this work we will consider in particular the case where2
0 = 0 (12)
1 = 1: (13)
In this case the full information solution (9) reduces to
kt = t: (14)
An instance of this setting is the Morris and Shin (2002)s beauty contest model outlined in the
Appendix.
Note that (14) is the only equilibrium under complete information and rationality, for any value
of  < 1. In the course of this paper we will consider the possibility of agents being heterogeneous
in their preferences, i.e., having heterogeneous i. Under complete information and rationality,
given the restrictions assumed on 0 and 1, this would not a¤ect agentsoptimal action, which
1To be precise, the model admits a unique solution for any value  UkK=Ukk 6= 1: for  UkK=Ukk > 1, though,
uniqueness derives from assuming that the action space is unbounded.
2Note that there is no loss of generality in this assumption, as it is always possible to redene a new ~t = (t)
and work with this new process. See Angeletos and Pavan (2007, Supplement).
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would still be given, for all agents, by (14). Things could be di¤erent with a more generic utility
function that would make 0 and 1 in (9) dependent on : in this case, under heterogeneous
preferences, actions would di¤er across agents even with complete information. We will neglect
this complication in this work and simply focus on results under restrictions (12)-(13). It follows
that the optimal action for each agent i will have to satisfy the equation
kit = E
i
tKt + (1  )Eitt: (15)
3 Complete information about fundamentals and learning
We have seen above the equilibrium xed point of the model if agents are fully rational. In
particular, this requires agents i) to have knowledge about the fundamental process t and to be
aware of the fact that everybody else in the economy does as well; and ii) to know that everybody
has the same utility function and therefore will behave alike.
In this section we maintain the hypothesis about knowledge of the fundamental, but relax the
assumption about full knowledge of otherspreferences. Agents therefore need to learn about each
others actions.
Agents, while still observing t, face uncertainty about aggregate action Kt. It follows from
(15) that the action of each agent i must satisfy the condition
kit = E
i
tKt + (1  ) t: (16)
This requires agents to have expectations about Kt at each time t. Given (16), the aggregate
model for the economy is
Kt =
Z 1
0
kitdi =
Z 1
0
EitKtdi+
Z 1
0
(1  ) tdi =
Z 1
0
EitKtdi+ (1  ) t: (17)
3.1 Adaptive learning
We assume rst that agents form their expectations as adaptive learners and use information about
observables to try to predict what current aggregate action will be. Besides the fundamental, we
assume here that also past aggregate actions are observable to agents with one period delay: after
each agent has played his own action and the economy has aggregated them all together, aggregate
outcomes become observable to everybody. It seems a natural choice for agents to try and use
such information about past aggregate actions in order to predict what current actions will be,
and therefore we allow agents to do so, even though ex post it will turn out that such information
about past aggregate actions is not actually useful. In the terminology of adaptive learning, the
forecasting model or perceived law of motion (PLM) we endow agents with will turn out to be
overparameterized, as it contains more variables than actually necessary.
The PLM for agents is therefore represented by
EitKt = a
i
t + b
i
tKt 1 + c
i
tt: (18)
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where parameters a; b; c are updated using econometric techniques such as recursive least squares
(RLS) and agents use their most recent estimates of such parameters to compute EitKt. Based
on this value, they then choose kit according to (16). Note that k
i
t is computed at each time t
according to the anticipated utility model of Kreps (1998), i.e., taking the most recent parameter
estimates as given and xed. In principle, knowing that they are involved in a repeated game,
agents might nd it convenient to act suboptimally today in order to speed up the learning process
and converge faster to equilibrium. We will not consider this possibility here.
Once kit has been chosen, 8i, the economy aggregates actions andKt is determined. Parameters
a; b; c can then be updated using standard statistical methods based on this new value for aggregate
data. The question is: does kit ! kt over time, i.e., can agents learn to coordinate on kt ?
Since agents use model (18) to form expectations about Kt and then, on the basis of those
expectations and the observed t, decide their optimal action, kit must have a (linear) representation
of the form (obtained by plugging (18) into (16))
kit = 
i
0 + 
i
1t + 
i
2Kt 1 (19)
with
i0 = a
i
i1 = (1  ) + ci
i2 = b
i:
Aggregating actions across agents in the economy we obtain the actual law of motion (ALM):
Kt =
Z 1
0
kitdi = 
Z 1
0
aidi+

(1  ) + 
Z 1
0
cidi

t + 
Z 1
0
bidi

Kt 1: (20)
Agents update parameters in their PLM (18) using forecast errors, according to the RLS
algorithm 264 a
i
t+1
bit+1
cit+1
375 =
264 a
i
t
bit
cit
375+ t 1R 1t wt  Kt   EitKt (21)
Rt = Rt 1 + t 1 (wtw0t  Rt 1) (22)
with
wt =
264 1Kt 1
t
375
representing the vector of regressors and
Kt   EitKt =


Z 1
0
aidi  ai

+


Z 1
0
bidi  bi

Kt 1 +

(1  ) + 
Z 1
0
cidi  ci

t
the forecast error.
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Results from stochastic approximation theory show that the limiting behavior of stochastic
recursive algorithms of the form (21)-(22) is well approximated by the behavior of a set of ordinary
di¤erential equations (ODEs) that can be obtained by mapping parameters in the PLM of agents to
those in the ALM (for a detailed discussion of the techniques involved, see Evans and Honkapohja,
2001). If an equilibrium (xed point) is stable under such set of di¤erential equations, it is said to
be E-stable. This is the concept of stability under adaptive learning that we will use throughout
this paper.3
Mapping parameters in (18) to those in (20) gives rise to the following system of di¤erential
equations for each agent i, that represent the evolution of parameters in agentsforecasting models:
_ai =
Z 1
0
aidi  ai (23)
_bi =
Z 1
0
bidi  bi (24)
_ci = 1  +
Z 1
0
cidi  ci: (25)
Note that there is a continuum of systems of di¤erential equations, with three equations for each
agent i. We can nd stability conditions for the learning process of each agent by computing
the derivatives d _a
i
dai ,
d_bi
dbi ,
d _ci
dci . Using Leibnizs rule, we can see that stability of equations (23)-(25)
requires  < 1: Remember that  is the private value of coordination: this condition says that such
value must not be too high. It also implies that when agents give negative value to coordination
(i.e.,  < 0), the system is stable: agents, trying to move away from each other, induce stability
under adaptive learning dynamics.
Proposition 1 Under adaptive learning, the fundamental symmetric equilibrium is learnable if
 < 1.
Proposition 1 says that the private value of coordination must not be too large for convergence
to obtain: if agents value coordination too much, they overreact to their expectations of other
agentsactions and the economy does not converge to the fundamental symmetric equilibrium.
Solution values for parameters are, after learning has converged and agents all have the same
expectations:
aeq = 0
beq = 0
ceq = 1;
which imply that the economy converges to the fundamental symmetric equilibrium
Kt = t (26)
since all agents implement the action kit = k

t = t.
3For a detailed explanation of the techniques involved, see Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
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Looking at PLM (18), we can see now that it is overparameterized with respect to the ALM
in equilibrium, as given by equation (26). In the terminology of the adaptive learning literature,
this means that such equilibrium is strongly E-stable with respect to this overparameterization,
as agents learn to discard from their forecasting model additional variables that do not enter into
the fundamental solution.
3.1.1 Heterogeneous preferences
Assume now that agents are heterogeneous in their preferences, so that each agent has his own i
and his optimal action is therefore given by
kit = 
iEitKt +
 
1  iEitt: (27)
Then the system (23)-(25) becomes
_ai =
Z 1
0
iaidi  ai (28)
_bi =
Z 1
0
ibidi  bi (29)
_ci = 1  i +
Z 1
0
icidi  ci; (30)
and stability of the learning process for each agent i therefore requires
R 1
0
idi < 1. This means
that we do not need all agents to value coordination in the same way, but only that on average
the value they attach to coordination is small enough.
Proposition 2 With heterogeneous i, adaptive learning converges if
R 1
0
idi < 1, i.e., if the
average value of coordination in the population is less than one.
Proposition 2 says that when preferences are heterogeneous, as long as the average value of
coordination is less than one, the learning process of all agents converges, even for those agents
that have i  1, since the evolution of other agentsexpectations (and therefore actions) acts as
stabilizer. This result is very important and must be stressed: learning conditions for each agent
depend not on individual preferences but on the average in the population, since it is this average
value that governs the dynamics of the underlying variables agents are trying to learn about.
3.2 Eductive learning
Eductive learning was rst introduced by Guesnerie (1992) as a way to investigate whether rational
and fully informed agents could coordinate on the rational expectations equilibrium with a process
of mental reasoning, that would lead them to exclude alternative outcomes thanks to the notion
of rationalizable strategies. Evans and Guesnerie (1993) showed the connection between eductive
learning and adaptive learning in a cobweb model: while adaptive learning requires  < 1, where
 measures the feedback from expectations to prices, for eductive learning to obtain it is necessary
instead that j  j< 1. Eductive learning conditions are therefore more stringent in this framework.
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In our setting, eductive learning requires agents to be able to coordinate on a strategy by
reasoning about what would be best for other agents to do and then implement their best response
to such behavior. Suppose agent i thinks that everybody else is implementing the aggregate action
K0; then his best reply, according to (16), would be
ki1 = K0 + (1  ) t:
Now, since this holds for any agent i, the aggregate action that follows, K1; would be
K1 = K0 + (1  ) t
which in turn would imply a best response from each agent that would give rise to aggregate action
K2
K2 = K1 + (1  ) t:
This mental process denes a di¤erence equation for the aggregate action K (and for a given t)
Kn = Kn 1 + (1  ) t (31)
which is stable for jj < 1, and in this case it converges to the symmetric full information equilib-
rium Kt = t.
Proposition 3 Under eductive learning, the economy converges to the symmetric full information
equilibrium if jj < 1.
In the model under consideration, therefore, eductive and adaptive learning conditions di¤er
from each other, similarly to what happens for the cobweb model. This is in fact not a surprise,
since our model, once t is assumed to be observable, is isomorphic to a cobweb model.
3.2.1 Heterogeneous preferences
Suppose now that agents are heterogeneous in their i. It is easy to verify that in this case eductive
learning would require
R 10 idi < 1, i.e., the average private value of coordination must be less
than one in absolute value.
Proposition 4 Under eductive learning with heterogeneity, the economy converges to the sym-
metric full information equilibrium if
R 10 idi < 1.
This result states that also in the case of eductive learning, it is su¢ cient that the condition
for stability holds on average in the population.
4 Learning with incomplete and private information
We are now interested in understanding the problem of coordination when agents do not directly
observe the fundamental process driving the economy but have to learn about it from imperfect
signals. In order to decide their best strategy, agents therefore need now to form expectations
about a fundamental exogenous component and about other agentsactions.
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Following the literature on global games (see, e.g., Morris and Shin (2001)), we assume that
agents do not observe the fundamental process t but receive instead noisy private (xit) and public
(yt) signals. The stochastic processes involved are therefore:
t =  + "t (32)
yt = t + ut (33)
xit = t + v
i
t (34)
where "; u; vi are i.i.d. shocks, normally distributed with mean zero and variances 2", 
2
u and 
2
v
respectively. The rst is a noise in the drawn made by nature at the beginning of each period
to determine the fundamental, while u and vi are observational noise in the public and private
signals.
Starting from the optimality condition
kit = E
i
tKt + (1  )Eitt; (35)
agents will now need to form expectations both on the fundamental t and on aggregate action
Kt in order to implement their individual best action.
Angeletos and Pavan (2007) show in their static setting that in the case of agents not observing
, but instead receiving a private signal x and a public signal y, agentsoptimal action has a linear
representation of the form
k(x; y) = 0 + 1 [(1  )x+ z] (36)
with
z = E [ j y]
and
 =  +
 (1  )
1   (1  )
 =  UkK
Ukk
 =
 2y + 
 2

 2x +  2y +  2
:
Would this strategy be learnable by agents in a repeated game? Note that while  is a
behavioral parameter, that depends on the preferences of agents,  represents characteristics of
the economy (the variances of the various shocks), and it is rather farfetched to assume that agents
know exactly these values.
We will now investigate whether agents, through adaptive and eductive learning, can learn to
implement their best strategy.
11
Strategic interactions, incomplete information and learning
4.1 Adaptive learning
As the only information available to agents are the private and public signals, it is natural to
assume that they use such information to help solve their coordination problem.4 Under adaptive
learning, therefore, agents use their private (xit) and the public (yt) signal to learn about the
fundamental t and aggregate action Kt, according to the PLMs:
EitKt = E
i(Kt j xit; yt) = aiK + biKxit + ciKyt (37)
Eitt = E
i(t j xit; yt) = ai + bixit + ciyt (38)
which imply, from (35),
kit = E
i
tKt + (1  )Eitt = ic + ixxit + iyyt: (39)
where
ic = a
i
K + (1  ) ai
ix = b
i
K + (1  ) bi
iy = c
i
K + (1  ) ci:
Aggregating over agents, we then obtain
Kt =
Z 1
0
kitdi = 
Z 1
0
aiKdi+
Z 1
0
biKx
i
tdi+
Z 1
0
ciKdiyt

+
+(1  )
Z 1
0
aidi+
Z 1
0
bix
i
tdi+
Z 1
0
cidiyt

= [aK + (1  ) a] + [cK + (1  ) c] yt + 
Z 1
0
biKx
i
tdi+ (1  )
Z 1
0
bix
i
tdi; (40)
where aK =
R 1
0
aiKdi, a =
R 1
0
aidi, cK =
R 1
0
ciKdi, c =
R 1
0
cidi. Since agents have private
information, learning is heterogeneous and the last two terms in (40) can not be reduced down to
averages. We therefore have
Kt = [aK + (1  ) a] + [cK + (1  ) c] yt +
Z 1
0

biK + (1  ) bi

xitdi: (41)
Since t is exogenous, parameters in equation (38) will converge over time to their ordi-
nary least squares estimates (i.e., conditions E
 
t   Eitt

= 0, E

xit
 
t   Eitt

= 0 and
4We could also allow agents to use past aggregate actions in their PLMs, but we have seen previously that such
variable is not actually useful for coordination and agents learn to discard it from their forecasting model.
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E

yt
 
t   Eitt

= 0 will hold in equilibrium):
ai !
 2" 
 2" +  2u +  2v
:= aeq (42)
bi !
 2v
 2" +  2u +  2v
:= beq (43)
ci !
 2u
 2" +  2u +  2v
:= ceq : (44)
As for parameters in the PLM for Kt, if agents update their estimates using RLS, the evolution
of parameters over time is represented by the stochastic recursive algorithm:
'it+1 = '
i
t + t
 1  Rit 1 wit  Kt   EitKt (45)
Rit = R
i
t 1 + t
 1  witwi0t  Rit 1 ; (46)
where
'i =
264a
i
k
bik
cik
375 ; wit =
264 1xit
yt
375 :
Since the PLM for each agent turns out to be misspecied with respect to the ALM, as the former
depends on individual xit and the latter on their population weighted average, we can not map
one to one parameters from the PLM to the ALM as we did previously but we need instead to
project the PLM onto the ALM to nd the ODEs that govern the dynamics for agentsbeliefs.
Using stochastic approximation theory we have
_'i =
d'i
d
= lim
t!1EQ(t; '
i; zit)
Q(t; 'i; zit) =
 
Rit
 1
wit
 
Kt   EitKt

;
where zit =

wi0t t
0
and expectations are taken over the invariant joint distribution of zit for xed
'i.
Since
Kt   EitKt = [aK + (1  ) a] + [cK + (1  ) c] yt +
+
Z 1
0

biK + (1  ) bi

xitdi  aiK   biKxit   ciKyt;
we have
lim
t!1EQ(:) = limE
264 Rit 1 wit
0B@h1 xit yti
264aK + (1  ) a   a
i
K
 biK
cK + (1  ) c   ciK
375
1CA+  Rit 1 wit Z 1
0

biK + (1  ) bi

xitdi
375 :
13
Strategic interactions, incomplete information and learning
By denoting
R 1 := lim
t!1E
 
Rit
 1
=
2641   2 + 2" + 2v 2 + 2"
 2 + 2" 
2 + 2" + 
2
u
375
 1
and noting that ai = a
eq
 , b
i
 = b
eq
 and c
i
 = c
eq
 in the limit, we then obtain
d'i
d
=
264aK + (1  ) a
eq
   aiK
 biK
cK + (1  ) ceq   ciK
375+R 1 [(1  ) beq ]Ewit Z 1
0
xitdi+R
 1Ewit
Z 1
0
biKx
i
tdi;
which, denoting B := [(1  ) beq ], leads to
_aiK = aK + (1  ) aeq   aiK +BR 111 E
Z 1
0
xitdi+BR
 1
12 Ex
i
t
Z 1
0
xitdi+BR
 1
13 Eyt
Z 1
0
xitdi+
+R 111 E
Z 1
0
biKx
i
tdi+R
 1
12 Ex
i
t
Z 1
0
biKx
i
tdi+R
 1
13 Eyt
Z 1
0
biKx
i
tdi
_biK =  biK +BR 121 E
Z 1
0
xitdi+BR
 1
22 Ex
i
t
Z 1
0
xitdi+BR
 1
23 Eyt
Z 1
0
xitdi+
+R 121 E
Z 1
0
biKx
i
tdi+R
 1
22 Ex
i
t
Z 1
0
biKx
i
tdi+R
 1
23 Eyt
Z 1
0
biKx
i
tdi
_ciK = cK + (1  ) ceq   ciK +BR 131 E
Z 1
0
xitdi+BR
 1
32 Ex
i
t
Z 1
0
xitdi+BR
 1
33 Eyt
Z 1
0
xitdi+
R 131 E
Z 1
0
biKx
i
tdi+R
 1
32 Ex
i
t
Z 1
0
biKx
i
tdi+R
 1
33 Eyt
Z 1
0
biKx
i
tdi:
Because expectations are taken over the distribution of zit for xed belief parameters '
i, it follows
that
_aiK = aK + (1  ) aeq   aiK +BR 111  +BR 112
 
2 + 2"

+BR 113
 
2 + 2"

+
+R 111 bK +R
 1
12 

bK
 
2 + 2"

+R 113 bK
 
2 + 2"

_biK =  biK +BR 121  +BR 122
 
2 + 2"

+BR 123
 
2 + 2"

+
+R 121 bK +R
 1
22 

bK
 
2 + 2"

+R 123 bK
 
2 + 2"

_ciK = cK + (1  ) ceq   ciK +BR 131  +BR 132
 
2 + 2"

+BR 133
 
2 + 2"

+
+R 131 bK +R
 1
32 

bK
 
2 + 2"

+R 133 bK
 
2 + 2"

;
where bK =
R 1
0
biKdi. We then have
_aiK = aK + (1  ) aeq +a   aiK (47)
_biK = b   biK (48)
_ciK = cK + (1  ) ceq +c   ciK ; (49)
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where
a = ~BR
 1
11  +
~B
 
R 112 +R
 1
13
  
2 + 2"

b = ~BR
 1
21  +
~B
 
R 122 +R
 1
23
  
2 + 2"

c = ~BR
 1
31  +
~B
 
R 132 +R
 1
33
  
2 + 2"

with
~B :=

bK + (1  ) beq

:
It can be shown that
a = ~B
 2"
 2" +  2u +  2v
(50)
b = ~B
 2v
 2" +  2u +  2v
(51)
c = ~B
 2u
 2" +  2u +  2v
: (52)
Stability of each system of three ODEs (one for each agent i) is governed by the Jacobian
J =
264
 _ai
ai
 _ai
bi 0
0 
_bi
bi 0
0  _c
i
bi
 _ci
ci
375 ; (53)
whose eigenvalues are the diagonal elements
 _ai
ai
=   1
 _bi
bi
= 
b
 ~B
  1
 _ci
ci
=   1:
It can be seen from (51) that
b
 ~B
=
 2v
 2" +  2u +  2v
;
and therefore conditions for learnability are
 < 1 (54)

 2v
 2" +  2u +  2v
< 1: (55)
Since the rst implies the second (because 0 < 
 2
v
 2" +
 2
u +
 2
v
 1), the system is stable when
 < 1.
Proposition 5 Under incomplete private information and adaptive learning, learning dynamics
converge if  < 1.
We can therefore see that under incomplete information the condition for adaptive learning to
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converge is the same as the one we derived under full information about the fundamental. Even
though convergence depends only on , we can see that now the relative precision of signals a¤ects
the size of one eigenvalue of the system and it will therefore a¤ect the dynamics of the system
over the convergence path towards equilibrium.
4.2 Heterogeneous preferences
Suppose now that agents are heterogeneous in their i: Going through the previous reasoning,
only now with heterogeneous i, it is possible to show that stability under learning depends onR 1
0
idi: again, the average value of coordination has to be less than one.
Proposition 6 Under incomplete private information and adaptive learning with heterogeneous
preferences, learnability obtains if
R 1
0
idi < 1, i.e., if the average value of coordination is less
than one.
4.3 Equilibrium under adaptive learning
Because of linearity in (47)-(49), in Section 4.1 we were able to derive conditions for learning
dynamics to converge without knowing the xed point for the system of ODEs. We will compute
now equilibrium values for parameters in agentsPLMs, and therefore determine optimal actions
for agents: this will allow us to show that the equilibrium we obtain under adaptive learning and
incomplete information is the same as the one derived by Angeletos and Pavan (2007). This result
means that, by learning statistically, agents are able to take into account the strategic component
of their interactions and coordinate on the game theoretical equilibrium, without the need of any
knowledge or information about other agentsbeliefs.
Equilibrium points for the learning algorithm of agents are resting points of the system (47)-
(49). The symmetric solution for each agent i is:
aeqK = a
eq

 
1 +
~Beq
1  
!
(56)
beqK = b
eq

(1  ) 2v
 2" +  2u + (1  ) 2v
(57)
ceqK = c
eq

 
1 +
~Beq
1  
!
; (58)
where
~Beq =
(1  ) 2v
 2" +  2u + (1  ) 2v
:
These equilibrium belief parameters imply the following coe¢ cients in equation (39) represent-
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ing the best action for generic agent i:
eqc = a
eq
K + (1  ) aeq =
 2" 
 2" +  2u + (1  ) 2v
(59)
eqx = b
eq
K + (1  ) beq =
(1  ) 2v
 2" +  2u + (1  ) 2v
(60)
eqy = c
eq
K + (1  ) ceq =
 2u
 2" +  2u + (1  ) 2v
: (61)
Comparing equilibrium values (36) from Angeletos and Pavan (2007) with the ones found here
under learning and given by (59-61), it is straightforward to show (once allowed from the change
of variable from z to y) that the two solutions are exactly the same.
By learning adaptively from data agents converge to the same strategic equilibrium derived
through game theoretical reasoning. Under adaptive learning and incomplete information, there-
fore, agents are able to take into account the strategic component of their interactions and coor-
dinate on their best strategy.
Proposition 7 Under incomplete private information and adaptive learning, if learning dynamics
converge, the economy converges to the strategic equilibrium as dened in Angeletos and Pavan
(2007).
Moreover, by looking at equations (59)-(61) we can immediately see that the strategic com-
ponent implicit in agents utility a¤ects the solution: in particular, if  > 0, i.e., actions are
strategic complements, agents put more weight on public information, while if  < 0, i.e., actions
are strategic substitutes, agents put more weight on private information.
4.4 Eductive learning
We consider now whether agents could learn the game theoretical equilibrium through a mental
process of reasoning about best reply strategies. Suppose agent i believes that a generic agent j
will follow the strategy
kjt = c + xx
j
t + yyt: (62)
Then agents i expected average action in the economy is
EitKt = c + xE
i
tt + yyt
= c + x
 2"
 2" +  2u +  2v
 + x
 2v
 2" +  2u +  2v
xit +

x
 2u
 2" +  2u +  2v
+ y

yt
and his best reply to it will be
kit = E
i
tKt + (1  )Eitt
= c + (x + 1  )
 2"
 2" +  2u +  2v
 + (x + 1  )
 2v
 2" +  2u +  2v
xit +
+

(x + 1  )
 2u
 2" +  2u +  2v
+ y

yt:
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But then, since agent i realizes that everybody else is doing the same reasoning, he will take this
new action as the action implemented by a generic agent j, and again compute his own best reply
to the ensuing aggregate action. Iteration on this reasoning denes three di¤erence equations in
notional time in the parameter space
c;n+1 = c;n +
 
x;n + 1  
  2"
 2" +  2u +  2v
 (63)
x;n+1 =
 
x;n + 1  
  2v
 2" +  2u +  2v
(64)
y;n+1 = y;n +
 
x;n + 1  
  2u
 2" +  2u +  2v
: (65)
It is immediate to show that the equilibrium values for these equations are those given in
(59-61). Moreover, conditions for eductive learning to converge are
jj < 1 (66)  2v 2" +  2u +  2v
 < 1; (67)
and since the rst implies the second, they reduce to jj < 1.
Proposition 8 Under incomplete private information and homogeneous preferences, eductive learn-
ing stability obtains if jj < 1.
We can see that both under adaptive and eductive learning, the relative precision of signals,
summarized by 
 2
v
 2" +
 2
u +
 2
v
, enters into conditions for stability, but it does not a¤ect whether
asymptotic convergence obtains. Things would be di¤erent, though, if agents were to have addi-
tional information about other agentsactions: in this case, in fact, asymptotic convergence under
eductive learning would be crucially a¤ected by the relative precision of public and private signals.
To see this point, suppose for simplicity that "t = 0 and that agent i believed the generic agent
j was acting according to5
kjt = x
j
t + (1  ) yt: (68)
This equation imposes a restriction across weights on the two signals, and therefore assumes agents
have some knowledge about other agentsbehavior: in particular, it implies that agents know that
the optimal action for a generic agent j is determined by a weighted average of the public and
private signals. In this case, the condition for eductive stability would reduce to
  2v
 2u +
 2
v
 < 1.
If the noise in the public signal increases and ultimately makes the signal useless ( 2u = 0), this
condition reduces to jj < 1: the public signal, therefore, makes it easier for agents to coordinate,
as it makes the eductive learning condition less stringent on the private value of coordination.
On the other hand, if the noise in the private signal increases and ultimately makes such a signal
useless ( 2v = 0), the equilibrium becomes eductively stable for any value of the private value of
5This is the "guess" used by Morris and Shin (2002) in order to nd the optimal strategy for agents in their
model. The argument they use to nd the solution, by looking for the xed point of a map from perceptions to
actions, is similar to the one used here, even though they dont give it an eductive learning interpretation.
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coordination , as all agents use only the public signal in deciding their actions, which makes the
coordination problem trivial in this case.
4.5 Heterogeneous preferences
We assume now that agents are heterogeneous in their i. Going through the same reasoning as
in the previous section, only now with heterogeneous i, it is easy to show that stability under
eductive learning obtains now if
R 10 idi < 1:
Proposition 9 Under incomplete private information and heterogeneous preferences, eductive
learning stability obtains if
R 10 idi < 1.
Again, only the average value of coordination in the economy matters for convergence.
5 Sunspot coordination
We now investigate whether in the incomplete information framework under consideration it could
be possible for agents to use a sunspot variable, one that is uncorrelated with fundamentals, to
gain information on other agentsactions and facilitate coordination.
In the previous sections we allowed agents to use two signals, one private and one public: both
signals turned out to be useful for agents in implementing their optimal strategy, but both signals
had the property of being correlated with the fundamental process t. We want instead to see
now if a signal that is uncorrelated with the fundamental but has the property of being observed
by all agents and it is therefore a common signal, could be exploited by agents for coordination.
5.1 Adaptive learning
We rst consider the problem of coordination with sunspot under adaptive learning. We continue
to assume that agents know their own preferences and are therefore able to realize that their
optimal action is given by (35). In addition to the public and private signals considered before,
though, now an additional variable t is observed by everybody in the economy and is allowed to
enter into the forecasting model for agents.
Once agents condition their forecasts on the sunspot component t, which is i.i.d. and inde-
pendent from xit, yt and t, PLMs (37)-(38) are modied as follows:
EitKt = E
i(Kt j xit; yt; t) = aiK + biKxit + ciKyt + diKt (69)
Eitt = E
i(t j xit; yt; t) = ai + bixit + ciyt + dit: (70)
With these expectations formation models, the temporary equilibrium for the economy would then
be
Kt = [aK + (1  ) a] + [cK + (1  ) c] yt +
Z 1
0

biK + (1  ) bi

xitdi+
+

 dK + (1  ) d

t: (71)
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Since t is exogenous and independent of t, and the sunspot component is independent from
the other regressors, it is immediate to show that over time estimates for di in (70) would converge
to zero. As for the sunspot parameter in PLM (69) for aggregate action Kt, the map from PLM
(69) to ALM (71) for this parameter gives rise to the ODE
_diK = 
dK + (1  ) d   diK ; (72)
where d represents population averages. Since in equilibrium d = 0, it follows that the only
symmetric solution, for generic , is diK = 0, 8i, and its stability requires  < 1. This means that
even if agents allow for aggregate actions to depend on an extraneous component and use such
component in deciding their optimal action, they will learn over time to discard it under the same
condition that ensures stability of the fundamental equilibrium.
Note that this result would carry over to a setting with heterogeneous preferences: even if
agents were to hold di¤erent i, equilibrium under learning would imply diK = 0, 8i, and the
condition for stability under learning would be
R 1
0
idi < 1.
The literature on sunspot and adaptive learning has found that learnability of a sunspot equi-
librium often depends on its representation (see,e.g., Evans and McGough 2005). In the present
setting, though, the representation of the sunspot does not matter, as agents do not need to project
it ahead in order to compute their optimal action.
Proposition 10 Under incomplete information and adaptive learning, agents can not coordinate
on an equilibrium with sunspots. Agents learn to discard the sunspot component from their model,
and the economy converges to the fundamental equilibrium, if  < 1 or, under heterogeneous
preferences, if
R 1
0
idi < 1.
5.2 Eductive learning
We consider now the issue of sunspot equilibria from an eductive learning perspective. Suppose
agent i believes that a generic agent j will follow the strategy
kjt = c + xx
j
t + yyt + t: (73)
Then agent i0s expected average action in the economy is
EitKt = c + xE
i
tt + yyt + t
c + x
 2"
 2" +  2u +  2v
 + x
 2v
 2" +  2u +  2v
xit +

x
 2u
 2" +  2u +  2v
+ y

yt + t
and his best reply action will be
kit = E
i
tKt + (1  )Eitt
c + (x + 1  )
 2"
 2" +  2u +  2v
 + (x + 1  )
 2v
 2" +  2u +  2v
xit +
+

(x + 1  )
 2u
 2" +  2u +  2v
+ y

yt + t:
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But then, since agent i realizes that everybody else is doing the same reasoning, he will take
this new action as the action implemented by a generic agent j, and again compute his own best
reply to the ensuing aggregate action. Iteration on this reasoning denes four di¤erence equations
in notional time in the parameter space, the rst three given as before by (63)-(65), plus the
additional equation for the evolution of the parameter attached to the sunspot variable:
;n+1 = ;n: (74)
Condition for stability of this di¤erence equation, which is independent from the other three, is
again
jj < 1;
or, in case of heterogeneous preferences, Z 1
0
idi
 < 1
and agents learn to discard the sunspot component, which does not a¤ect actions in equilibrium.
Proposition 11 Under incomplete information and eductive learning, agents can not coordinate
on an equilibrium with sunspots. The economy converges to the fundamental equilibrium if jj < 1
or, under heterogeneous preferences, if
R 10 idi < 1.
6 Discussion
The basic framework used here to analyze the issues of learning and coordination can be interpreted
as representing a number of specic economic models. For example, it could be interpreted as a
model of investment and production complementarities, where the return on investment for each
rm depends not only on their own productivity but also on how much investment is done by other
rms in the same sector; or again, it could represent a beauty contest economy where nancial
investors try to outbid each other on an asset whose value depends not only on its fundamental,
but also on what agents are willing to pay for it.
Our results show that in all these cases agents are able to learn to coordinate on the funda-
mental equilibrium, provided a certain condition on their preferences holds. The specic condition
required, though, depends on whether, in order to predict other agentsactions, they engage in a
mental process of higher order thinking (eductive learning) or if instead they rely on the gathering
and processing of external information (adaptive learning).
In particular, we have shown that, both under perfect and imperfect information about the
fundamental process driving the economy, conditions for adaptive learning are less stringent than
those for eductive learning. It is interesting to note that under adaptive learning it makes a
di¤erence whether actions are strategic substitutes or complements, while for eductive learning this
distinction does not matter. Adaptive learning, in fact, requires  < 1: when actions are strategic
substitutes ( < 0), the equilibrium is therefore learnable, while if actions are complements ( >
0), the equilibrium might not be learnable. This distinction does not emerge instead for eductive
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learning, which requires jj < 1: even if actions are substitutes, the equilibrium might not be
learnable.
Results on adaptive learning show that by solely rely on past observables, and without the
need to engage in a mental process of guessing and outguessing each other, agents can learn to
implement their optimal, game theoretical strategy. Marcet and Sargent (1989) showed that the
problem of forecasting the forecasts of others in environments where there is private information
could be solved by agents using adaptive learning on a reduced form of the model. Our result goes
in the same direction in showing that when agents need to forecast other agentsactions, they are
able to coordinate on the rational expectations equilibrium by relying solely on adaptive learning
based on the observables of the economy.
An implication of our result is that, while agents coordinate on their best action from the
individual perspective, in all cases where a private value for coordination () di¤erent from zero is
socially ine¢ cient, adaptive learning dynamics drive the economy towards the socially ine¢ cient
equilibrium. For example, Angeletos and Pavan (2007) show that in beauty contest economies
private motives for coordination are not warranted from a social perspective, and the equilibrium
that emerges under incomplete private information is ine¢ cient.
In Section 5 we have then considered the possibility of agentscoordination through a sunspot
variable, and we have shown that learning dynamics (both eductive and adaptive) rule out such
possibility in the contest of the present model: even if agents use an extraneous variable to try
improve their performance, over time they learn to discard such component as irrelevant for the
economy, provided the conditions for learnability of the fundamental equilibrium hold.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have considered the problem of learning and coordination for agents when their
actions are strategic complements or substitutes. Under complete information about the exogenous
fundamental, but uncertainty about other players actions, both under adaptive learning and
eductive learning, agents can learn the fundamental, symmetric equilibrium, but specic conditions
for learnability di¤er. In case of eductive learning, the required condition is that agents do not
value coordination too much or too little, because in both cases they would generate instability. In
case of adaptive learning, instead, the requirement is only that agents do not value coordination
too much. Adaptive learning therefore converges for a larger set of economies. In a setting with
heterogeneous agents, moreover, we nd that what matters for convergence is only the average
characteristic of the population, in all cases.
Under incomplete and private information about the fundamental, we nd that both under
adaptive and eductive learning, conditions for learnability are the same as the ones we found
under complete information: incomplete information therefore does not impact on the conditions
for learnability. Interestingly, even under adaptive learning, agentsbeliefs converge towards the
optimal values implied by the game theoretical, strategic equilibrium: adaptive learning, therefore,
leads agents to incorporate strategic considerations into their actions, without them having to
engage in a process of higher order thinking. Our work therefore conrms and strengthens the
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result of Marcet and Sargent (1989) that adaptive learning is a powerful tool in solving the problem
of beliefs coordination.
Finally, we have shown that sunspot components are not learnable by agents in this setting,
and can not therefore enter in the solution under learning dynamics.
8 Appendix
An instance of the setting laid out in Section 2 is the beauty contest framework used by Morris
and Shin (2002):
Ut =  Lt =  Eit
h

 
kit  Kt
2
+ 
 
kit   t
2
+ 2k
i
: (75)
By solving agents maximization problem, we obtain the optimal action
kit =

 + 
EitKt +

 + 
Eitt
or, dening   + ,
kit = E
i
tKt + (1  )Eitt: (76)
Using loss function (75), the restrictions necessary for uniqueness and boundedness of equilibrium
correspond to ( + ) > 0 and  < 1.
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